Even while supporting the physical presence standard, Quill acknowledges that the court has come to the opposite conclusion in other decisions. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the court found that “jurisdiction … may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.… [I]t is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence. … So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ towards residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.… (Emphasis in original).”
This apparent contradiction hinges on the “different constitutional concerns and policies” of two constitutional clauses, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Quill explains, “Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. … In contrast, the Commerce Clause, and its nexus requirement, are informed … by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy.”
In Quill, the desire to prevent a state regulation from jeopardizing the national economy takes precedence. The court found it beneficial to maintain a clear rule on nexus, particularly since “our law in this area is something of a quagmire.” The decision reads, “The continuing value of a bright line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule [i.e., the physical presence standard] remains good law.”